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西方强大的秘密:宽恕与讽刺

西方强大的秘密:宽恕与讽刺

Roger Scruton
Forgiveness and Irony:

What makes the West strong





Hermitage, St. Petersburg, Russia/The Bridgeman Art Library


Wherever the Western vision of political order has gained a foothold, we find freedom of expression: not merely the freedom to disagree with others publicly about matters of faith and morality but also the freedom to satirize solemnity and to ridicule nonsense, including solemnity and nonsense of the sacred kind. This freedom of conscience requires secular government. But what makes secular government legitimate?

That question is the starting point of Western political philosophy, the consensus among modern thinkers being that sovereignty and law are made legitimate by the consent of those who must obey them. They show this consent in two ways: by a real or implied “social contract,” whereby each person agrees with every other to the principles of government; and by a political process through which each person participates in the making and enacting of the law. The right and duty of participation is what we mean, or ought to mean, by “citizenship,” and the distinction between political and religious communities can be summed up in the view that political communities are composed of citizens and religious communities of subjects—of those who have “submitted.” If we want a simple definition of the West as it is today, the concept of citizenship is a good starting point. That is what millions of migrants are roaming the world in search of: an order that confers security and freedom in exchange for consent.
That is what people want; it does not, however, make them happy. Something is missing from a life based purely on consent and polite accommodation with your neighbors—something of which Muslims retain a powerful image through the words of the Koran. This missing thing goes by many names: sense, meaning, purpose, faith, brotherhood, submission. People need freedom; but they also need the goal for which they can renounce it. That is the thought contained in the word “Islam”: the willing submission, from which there is no return.
It goes without saying that the word’s connotations are different for Arabic speakers and for speakers of Turkish, Malay, or Bengali. Turks, who live under a secular law derived from the legal systems of post-Napoleonic Europe, are seldom disposed to think that, as Muslims, they must live in a state of continual submission to a divine law that governs all of social and political life. The 20 percent of Muslims who are Arabs, however, feel the mesmerizing rhythms of the Koran as an unbrookable current of compulsion and are apt to take “Islam” literally. For them, this particular act of submission may mean renouncing not only freedom but also the very idea of citizenship. It may involve retreating from the open dialogue on which the secular order depends into the “shade of the Koran,” as Sayyid Qutb put it, in a disturbing book that has inspired the Muslim Brotherhood ever since. Citizenship is precisely not a form of brotherhood, of the kind that follows from a shared act of heartfelt submission: it is a relation among strangers, a collective apartness, in which fulfillment and meaning are confined to the private sphere. To have created this form of renewable loneliness is the great achievement of Western civilization, and my way of describing it raises the question of whether it is worth defending and, if so, how.
My answer is yes, it is worth defending, but only if we recognize the truth that the present conflict with Islamism makes vivid to us: citizenship is not enough, and it will endure only if associated with meanings to which the rising generation can attach its hopes and its search for identity. There is no doubt that the secular order and the search for meaning coexisted quite happily when Christianity provided its benign support to both. But (especially in Europe) Christianity has retreated from public life and is now being driven from private life as well. For people of my generation, it seemed, for a while, as though we could rediscover meaning through culture. The artistic, musical, literary, and philosophical traditions of our civilization bore so many traces of a world-transforming significance that it would be enough—we thought—to pass those things on. Each new generation could then inherit by means of them the spiritual resources that it needed. But we reckoned without two all-important facts: first, the second law of thermodynamics, which tells us that without an injection of energy, all order decays; and second, the rise of what I call the “culture of repudiation,” as those appointed to inject that energy have become increasingly fatigued with the task and have eventually jettisoned the cultural baggage under whose weight they staggered.
This culture of repudiation has transmitted itself, through the media and the schools, across the spiritual terrain of Western civilization, leaving behind it a sense of emptiness and defeat, a sense that nothing is left to believe in or endorse, save only the freedom to believe. And a belief in the freedom to believe is neither a belief nor a freedom. It encourages hesitation in the place of conviction and timidity in the place of choice. It is hardly surprising that so many Muslims in our cities today regard the civilization surrounding them as doomed, even if it is a civilization that has granted them something that they may be unable to find where their own religion triumphs, which is a free, tolerant, and secular rule of law. For they were brought up in a world of certainties; around them, they encounter only doubts.
If repudiation of its past and its identity is all that Western civilization can offer, it cannot survive: it will give way to whatever future civilization can offer hope and consolation to the young and fulfill their deep-rooted human need for social membership. Citizenship, as I have described it, does not fulfill that need: and that is why so many Muslims reject it, seeking instead that consoling “brotherhood” (ikhwan) that has so often been the goal of Islamic revivals. But citizenship is an achievement that we cannot forgo if the modern world is to survive: we have built our prosperity on it, our peace and our stability, and—even if it does not provide happiness—it defines us. We cannot renounce it without ceasing to be.
What is needed is not to reject citizenship as the foundation of social order but to provide it with a heart. And in seeking that heart, we should turn away from the apologetic multiculturalism that has had such a ruinous effect on Western self-confidence and return to the gifts that we have received from our Judeo-Christian tradition.
The first of these gifts is forgiveness. By living in a spirit of forgiveness, we not only uphold the core value of citizenship but also find the path to social membership that we need. Happiness does not come from the pursuit of pleasure, nor is it guaranteed by freedom. It comes from sacrifice: that is the great message that all the memorable works of our culture convey. The message has been lost in the noise of repudiation, but we can hear it once again if we devote our energies to retrieving it. And in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the primary act of sacrifice is forgiveness. The one who forgives sacrifices resentment and thereby renounces something that had been dear to his heart.
The Koran invokes at every point the mercy, compassion, and justice of God. But the God of the Koran is not a lenient God. In His Koranic manifestation, God forgives sparingly and with obvious reluctance. He is manifestly not amused by human folly and weakness—nor, indeed, is He amused by anything. The Koran, unlike the Hebrew Bible or the New Testament, is a joke-free zone.
This brings us to another of our civilization’s gifts to us: irony. There is already a developing streak of irony in the Hebrew Bible, one that the Talmud amplifies. But a new kind of irony dominates Christ’s judgments and parables, which look on the spectacle of human folly and wryly show us how to live with it. A telling example is Christ’s verdict in the case of the woman taken in adultery: “Let he who is without fault cast the first stone.” In other words: “Come off it; haven’t you wanted to do what she did, and already done it in your hearts?” Some have suggested that this story is a later insertion—one of many that the early Christians culled from the store of inherited wisdom attributed to the Redeemer after his death. Even if that is true, however, it merely confirms the view that the Christian religion has made irony central to its message. It was a troubled, post-Enlightenment Christian, Søren Kierkegaard, who pointed to irony as the virtue that united Socrates and Christ.
The late Richard Rorty saw irony as a state of mind intimately connected with the postmodern worldview—a withdrawal from judgment that nevertheless aims at a kind of consensus, a shared agreement not to judge. The ironic temperament, however, is better understood as a virtue—a disposition aimed at a kind of practical fulfillment and moral success. Venturing a definition of this virtue, I would describe it as a habit of acknowledging the otherness of everything, including oneself. However convinced you are of the rightness of your actions and the truth of your views, look on them as the actions and the views of someone else and rephrase them accordingly. So defined, irony is quite distinct from sarcasm: it is a mode of acceptance rather than a mode of rejection. It also points both ways: through irony, I learn to accept both the other on whom I turn my gaze, and also myself, the one who is gazing. Pace Rorty, irony is not free from judgment: it simply recognizes that the one who judges is also judged, and judged by himself.
The West’s democratic inheritance stems, I would argue, from the habit of forgiveness. To forgive the other is to grant him, in your heart, the freedom to be. It is therefore to acknowledge the individual as sovereign over his life and free to do both right and wrong. A society that makes permanent room for forgiveness therefore tends automatically in a democratic direction, since it is a society in which the voice of the other is heard in all decisions that affect him. Irony—the recognition and acceptance of otherness—amplifies this democratic tendency and also helps thwart the mediocrity and conformity that are the downsides of a democratic culture.
Forgiveness and irony lie at the heart of our civilization. They are what we have to be most proud of, and our principal means to disarm our enemies. They underlie our conception of citizenship as founded in consent. And they are expressed in our conception of law as a means to resolve conflicts by discovering the just solution to them. It is not often realized that this conception of law has little in common with Muslim sharia, which is regarded as a system of commands issued by God and not capable of, or in need of, further justification.
God’s commandments are important to Christians and Jews, too; but they are not seen as sufficient for the good government of human societies. They must be supplemented by another kind of law, responsive to the changing forms of human conflict. The parable of the tribute money makes this transparently clear (“Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s”), as does the papal doctrine of the two swords—the two forms of law, human and divine, on which good government depends. The law enforced by our courts requires the parties to “submit” only to the secular jurisdiction. It treats each party as a responsible individual, acting freely for himself. This feature of law is particularly vivid in the minds of the English-speaking peoples, whose system of common law consists of freedoms—won by the citizen from the state—that the state must uphold. Sharia consists of obligations imposed by God that the courts must enforce. It is a means to ensure “submission” to the will of God, as revealed in the Koran and the Sunna.
How do these thoughts bear on our current situation? In particular, how does this invocation of deep aspects of our Judeo-Christian heritage help us respond to the threat posed by Islamist terrorism, and how can we achieve the much-needed reconciliation with Islam without which our political inheritance will remain in jeopardy?
Terrorism and Islam have become associated in the popular mind, and in response, well-intentioned commentators urge that there is nothing new in terrorism and nothing about Islam that predisposes its adherents toward the use of it. Wasn’t it the Jacobins of the French Revolution who unleashed the beast? Didn’t terrorism find its political home with the Russian nihilists of the nineteenth century, thereafter to be adopted by radical movements throughout the twentieth?
The response is reasonable, but it prompts us to explore the deeper question of motive. What draws people to the use of terror? Is it chosen, as its apologists suggest, as a tactical device? Or is it chosen as an end in itself? From a certain perspective, it seems plausible to trace modern terrorism to the Enlightenment, to the idea of human equality, and to the attitude of ressentiment that Nietzsche rightly discerned in the heart of modern communities—the desire to destroy what one longs for when seeing it in others’ hands. But such a diagnosis ignores the fact that terrorism, as typified by the Russian nihilists and recorded in their name, is radically disconnected from any goal. Sometimes, it is true, terrorists—the Bolsheviks, the IRA, ETA—have furnished themselves with a cause, making believe that with the achievement of a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” a united Ireland, or a Basque national state, their purposes will be achieved and they can lay down their arms. But the cause is usually vague and utopian to the point of unreality, and its nonachievement seems part of its point—a way to justify the constant renewal of violence.
Terrorists might equally be entirely causeless, or dedicated to a cause so vaguely and metaphysically characterized that nobody (least of all themselves) could believe it to be achievable. Such were the Russian nihilists, as Dostoyevsky and Turgenev described them. Such, too, were the Italian Brigate Rosse and the German Baader-Meinhof gang of my youth. As Michael Burleigh shows in his magisterial Blood and Rage, modern terrorism has been far more interested in violence than in anything that might be achieved by it. It is typified by Joseph Conrad’s Professor, in The Secret Agent, who raises his glass “to the destruction of all that is.”
The vague or utopian character of the cause is therefore an important part of terrorism’s appeal, for it means that the cause does not define or limit the action. It is waiting to be filled with meaning by the terrorist, who is searching to change not the world but himself. To kill someone who has neither offended you nor given just cause for punishment, you have to believe yourself wrapped in some kind of angelic cloak of justification. You then come to see the killing as showing that you are indeed an angel. Your existence receives its final ontological proof.
Terrorists pursue a moral exultation, a sense of being beyond the reach of ordinary human judgment, radiated by a self-assumed permission of the kind enjoyed by God. Terrorism of this kind, in other words, is a search for meaning—the very meaning that citizenship, conceived in abstract terms, cannot provide. Even in its most secularized form, terrorism involves a kind of religious hunger.
It is very difficult to kill the innocent Mrs. Smith and her children as they go about their family shopping. Hence this strategy for ego-building cannot begin simply from the desire to kill. Mrs. Smith must become something else—a symbol of some abstract condition, a kind of incarnation of a universal enemy. Terrorists of the modern kind therefore tend to lean on doctrines that remove the humanity from the people they target. Marx’s theories served this purpose well, since they created the idea of the bourgeoisie, the “class enemy,” who had the same function in Bolshevik ideology as the Jews did in the ideology of the Nazis. Mrs. Smith and her children stand behind the target, which is the abstract bourgeois family. It just so happens that, when the bomb hits this target made of fictions, the shrapnel passes easily through it into the real body of Mrs. Smith. Sad for the Smiths, and often you will find terrorists making a kind of abstract apology, saying that it wasn’t their fault that Mrs. Smith got blown up and that really people ought not to stand behind targets in quite that way.
Islamist terrorists are animated, at some level, by the same troubled search for meaning and the same need to stand above their victims in a posture of transcendental exculpation. Ideas of liberty, equality, or historical right have no influence on their thinking, and they are not interested in possessing the powers and privileges that their targets enjoy. The things of this world have no real value for them, and if they sometimes seem to aim at power, it is only because power would enable them to establish the kingdom of God—an aim that they, like the rest of us, know to be impossible and therefore endlessly renewable in the wake of failure. Their carelessness about others’ lives is matched by their carelessness about their own. Life has no particular value for them; death beckons constantly from the near horizon of their vision. And in death, they perceive the only meaning that matters: the final transcendence of this world and of the accountability to others that this world demands of us.
People inoculated by the culture of repudiation, reluctant to acknowledge the search for meaning as a human universal, tend to think that all conflicts are really political, concerning who has power over whom. They are apt to believe that the causes of Islamist terrorism lie in the “social injustice” against which the terrorists protest and that the failure of all other attempts to rectify things renders their regrettable methods necessary. This seems to me to misinterpret radically the motives of terrorism in general and of Islamism in particular. The Islamist terrorist, like the European nihilist, is primarily interested in himself and his spiritual condition, and he has no real desire to change things here below, where he does not belong. He wants to belong to God, not to the world, and this means witnessing to God’s law and kingdom by destroying all that stands in their way, his own body included. Death is his ultimate act of submission: through death, he dissolves into a new and immortal brotherhood. The terror that his death inflicts both exalts the world of brotherhood and casts a devastating blow against the rival world of strangers, in which citizenship, not brotherhood, is the binding principle.
This is why we should recognize that we face a new kind of threat, one that does not have limited or negotiable objectives, that we cannot easily meet with a military confrontation, and that the usual means cannot deter. There is nothing we can offer the Islamists that will enable them to say that they have achieved their goal. If they succeeded in destroying a Western city with a nuclear bomb, or a whole population with a deadly virus, they would regard it as a triumph, even though it conferred no material, political, or religious benefit whatsoever.
Of course, the mass of ordinary Muslims would be appalled at such an event and would regard mass murder of the kind contemplated by al-Qaida as an outrage absolutely forbidden by the law of God. And there are encouraging signs that thinking Muslims are attempting to find a way to declare a public commitment to coexistence with the other two Abrahamic religions and to uphold the love of neighbor, even when the neighbor is of another faith. Witness the 2007 letter to religious leaders in the West, signed by 140 distinguished Muslim scholars, calling for dialogue among the faiths and for mutual respect as the foundation of coexistence. However, we should note two important facts. The first is that Islam has never succeeded in establishing any decisive source of religious authority. Each spiritual leader is self-appointed, like the Ayatollah Khomeini, and has no credibility outside his own circle of followers. People often say what a pity it is that Islam has had no Protestant Reformation. In fact, it is one unending series of Protestant Reformations, each of which claims to be the sole truth in the matter of man’s obedience to God.
The second important fact—and it is, I believe, connected—is that Muslims show a remarkable ability to turn a blind eye to the atrocities committed in the name of their faith and to rally against anyone who disparages it. The notorious Danish cartoons caused outrage, uniting Muslims everywhere in acts of destruction and calls for revenge. A few days later, the al-Askari mosque in Samarra, one of the Shiite community’s holiest places, was blown up by Islamists. But where were the protests, outside Iraq? Far more Muslims than non-Muslims have been killed by Islamic terrorists. But when do those who claim to speak for Muslims mention this statistic? For that matter, the whole point of the infamous cartoons was to make us look at the atrocious things done in the Prophet’s name. Does he approve or doesn’t he?
Muslims must face up to this question. But a rooted double standard often prevents their turning on fellow Muslims the self-righteous anger that they turn on enemies of the faith. Such double standards are the direct result of the loss of irony. They stem from an inability to accept the otherness of everything, to stand outside one’s own opinions, and even one’s own faith, so as to see it as the faith of someone else. Not that Islam has always lacked irony in this respect: the works of the Sufi masters are full of it. But the Sufi masters (I think of Rumi and Hafiz especially) belong to that great and self-knowing Islamic culture on which the Islamists have turned their backs, embracing instead the narrow-minded bigotry of Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab or the self-deceived nostalgia of the Muslim Brotherhood and Sayyid Qutb.
The confrontation that we are involved in is thus not political or economic; it is not the first step toward a negotiation or a calling to account. It is an existential confrontation. The question put to us is: “What right do you have to exist?” By answering, “None whatsoever,” we invite the reply, “That’s what I thought.” An answer can avert the threat only by facing it down; and that means being absolutely convinced that we do have a right to exist and that we are prepared to concede an equal right to our opponents, though only on condition that the concession is mutual. No other strategy has a remote chance of succeeding.
Al-Qaida may be weak; the whole conspiracy to destroy the West may be little more than a fiction in the brains of the neoconservatives, who themselves may be a fiction in the brains of liberals. But the threat does not come from a conspiracy or from an organization. It comes from individuals undergoing a traumatic experience that we do not fully understand—the experience of a déraciné Muslim confronting the modern world, and without the benefit of the two gifts of forgiveness and irony. Such a person is an unpredictable by-product of unforeseen and uncomprehended circumstances, and our best efforts to understand his motives have so far suggested no policy that would deter attacks.
What, then, should our stance be in this existential confrontation? I think we should emphasize the very great virtues and achievements that we have built on our legacy of tolerance and show a willingness to criticize and amend all the vices to which it has also given undue space. We should resurrect Locke’s distinction between liberty and license and make it absolutely clear to our children that liberty is a form of order, not a license for anarchy and self-indulgence. We should cease to mock the things that mattered to our parents and grandparents, and we should be proud of what they achieved. This is not arrogance but a just recognition of our privileges.
We should also drop all the multicultural waffling that has so confused public life in the West and reaffirm the core idea of social membership in the Western tradition, which is the idea of citizenship. By sending out the message that we believe in what we have, are prepared to share it, but are not prepared to see it destroyed, we do the only thing that we can do to defuse the current conflict. Because forgiveness is at the heart of our culture, this message ought surely to be enough, even if we proclaim it in a spirit of irony.
Roger Scruton is a writer and philosopher. His article is adapted from his McNish Lecture for the Advancement of Western Civilization at the University of Calgary.

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[斯克鲁顿]西方强大的秘密:宽恕与讽刺

[光明译丛]

西方强大的秘密:宽恕与讽刺

罗杰·斯克鲁顿 著 吴万伟 译

光明网-光明观察 刊发时间:2009-02-18 15:52:20


 

  无论在哪里,只要西方的政治秩序有了立脚之地,我们就能发现言论自由:不仅有公开表达不同于他人的信仰和道德观点的自由而且有讽刺庄重嘲笑荒谬的自由,包括上帝的庄重和荒谬在内。这种心灵上的自由要求世俗政府,但世俗
政府怎样才能拥有合法性呢?

  这个问题是西方政治哲学的起点,现代思想家们的共识是至高无上的权利和法律是通过得到必须尊重这些的人的认可而获得合法性。人们表达这种认可有两种形式:一种是真正的或者隐含的“社会契约”,每个人都相互同意政府管理原则,另一种是人人都参与制订和实施法律的政治过程。参与的权利和义务是我们所说的“公民身份”的内涵。我们可以这样总结政治社会和宗教社会的区别:政治社会由公民组成,宗教社会由“听任摆布”的臣民组成。如果我们想要一个当今对西方的简单定义,公民概念是个很好的起点。这是千百万移民满世界寻找的理想:用同意权交换能为他带来安全和自由的秩序。

  这是人人都想要的东西,但它不能保证让人获得幸福。纯粹建立在认同以及与邻居礼貌地交往的基础上的生活总缺少一些东西,那些穆斯林通过古兰经的话语而保留的力量强大的东西。这种缺失的东西有很多名字,比如意识、意义、目的、信仰、兄弟情、服从等等。人们需要自由,但也需要宁愿放弃自由而得到的其他目标。这是“伊斯兰”这个词包含的思想:即不求回报、心甘情愿的服从。

  当然,这个词的隐含意义对于说阿拉伯语、土耳其语、马来语或孟加拉语的人来说,含义是不同的。生活在来源于后拿破仑欧洲法制体系的世俗法律下的土耳其人很少愿意承认,他们作为穆斯林必须生活在仍然控制社会和政治生活各个方面的神圣法律统治下。但是说阿拉伯语的20%的穆斯林觉得遵循古兰经的节奏是不容质疑的强制性规定,他们倾向于从字面上理解“伊斯兰”。对他们来说,服从的行为本身就意味着不仅放弃自由而且放弃公民身份的想法。它可能涉及到人们从世俗秩序所依赖的公开对话中退出,进入“古兰经的庇护”所,正如赛义德·库特布(Sayyid Qutb)在一本让人担忧的激发成立穆斯林兄弟社的书中说的。公民身份恰恰不是兄弟情的形式,不是出于真心服从而采取的共同行动,而是陌生人之间的关系,是相互独立的个体的集合,满足感和意义只局限在私人领域。创造这种可以更新的孤独的形式是西方文明的伟大成就。我对它的描述产生了一个问题:公民身份是否值得捍卫?如果值得,如何捍卫?

  我的答案是肯定的,它值得捍卫,但是必须承认我们当今与伊斯兰的冲突让这我们更加清楚地认识到如下的真理:仅有公民身份是不够的,要想持久就必须赋予它新的意义,新一代人可以把自己的希望和对身份的探索附着在上面。毫无疑问,当基督教为世俗秩序和意义探索提供仁慈的支持时,两者是非常和谐地共存的。但是如今(尤其是欧洲)基督教已经从公共生活中退出,而且正退出私人生活。对于我这一代人来说,曾经有段时间我们似乎可以从文化中重新找到生活的意义。西方文明的艺术、音乐、文学、哲学传统在改变世界方面留下这么多痕迹,我们觉得把这些东西传递下去已经足够了。每一代人都可以从这些传统中继承他们所需要的精神资源。但是我们没有考虑到两个非常重要的事实:第一,热力学第二法则告诉我们如果没有新能量进入,所有秩序都会衰弱。第二,我所说的“排斥一切的文化”的兴起。本来应该提供新能源的东西在执行任务时已经被文化行李压得踉踉跄跄,越来越力不从心,最终只能把它们扔掉。

  这种排斥一切的文化通过媒体、学校转播到西方文明的每个精神领地,让人们普遍产生一种空虚感和失败感,产生一种除了相信没有任何东西值得信任或者赞同的自由外什么都没有的意识。但这种自由信仰既不是自由也不是信仰,它鼓励人们在该做出决定时犹豫不决,在该做出选择时缩头缩脑。难怪我们城市里的这么多穆斯林认为他们周围的文明注定要衰亡了,即使这个文明给予他们自由、宽容、世俗的法治等,这些都是他们自己的宗教占主导地位的社会里无法得到的东西。因为他们是在具有确定性的社会中长大,如今却到处遭遇怀疑和不确定性。

  如果西方文明所能提供的东西只是拒绝自己的历史和身份,那它是不能生存下去的:必将被那些能够为年轻人提供希望和安慰以实现他们心底的渴望,即社会成员身份的人类需要的其他未来文明所取代。正如我已经描述的,公民身份并不能满足这个需要,这就是为什么这么多穆斯林排斥它,反而从“精诚兄弟社”(ikhwan)那里寻求精神安慰。这常常是伊斯兰竞争者的目标。但是如果现代世界要想生存下去的话,公民身份是我们无法放弃的成就:我们的繁荣、我们的和平与稳定就建立在它上面,它是我们的定义,即使它不能提供幸福。放弃公民身份,我们就无法存在了。

  现在需要的不是拒绝作为社会秩序基础的公民身份而是为它提供一个心灵。我们在寻找心灵的时候,应该摆脱具有道歉意味的多元文化主义,重新回到犹太教基督教传统的馈赠,因为多元文化主义给西方的自信心造成了毁灭性的影响。

  第一个礼物是宽恕。怀着一颗宽恕的心生活,我们不仅坚持了公民身份的核心价值而且找到所需要的社会成员身份的道路。幸福不是来自对快乐的追求,也不能靠自由来保证。它来自牺牲:这是西方文化所有值得纪念的著作所传播的最重大信息。这种信息在排斥一切的噪音中消失了,但是如果我们投入精力重新复兴它的
话,能够再次听见它的召唤。在犹太教基督教传统中,牺牲的第一个行为就是宽恕。宽恕别人的人献出了怨恨,因此放弃了曾经对他来说非常宝贵的东西。

  古兰经在任何时候都激发出神的仁慈、同情、和正义,但是古兰经的真主不是宽厚的神。在古兰经文献中,真主很少宽恕,即使宽恕时也非常地不情愿。他显然对人类的愚蠢和软弱感到恼火,实际上他不觉得有什么可笑的事。和希伯来圣经或者《新约全书》不同,古兰经里根本没有笑话。

  这让我们再看西方文明的另外一个礼物:讽刺。在希伯来圣经中已经有了越来越强烈的讽刺味道,《塔木德经》中有明显的表现。但是耶稣基督的判断和寓言中的新型讽刺是最重要的,这种讽刺揭露了人类的愚蠢,并用挖苦的口吻向我们展示如何忍受这种愚蠢。一个很能说明问题的例子是耶稣对于被控犯了通奸罪的妇女的审判:“你们中间谁是没有罪的,谁就可以先拿石头打她。”(译者注:请参阅约翰福音第8节)。换句话说“忘了它吧,难道你没有想过她做的事吗?至少在心中已经做过了?”有人曾认为这个故事是后来添加上去的,即早期基督徒在救世主死后收集的表现其智慧的许多故事之一。但即使这是真实的,仍然证明了基督教把讽刺作为传播福音的核心的观点。指出讽刺是把苏格拉底和耶稣结合起来的美德的人是后启蒙时代的麻烦不断的基督徒克尔凯郭尔(Kierkegaard)。

  过世的理查德·罗蒂(Richard Rorty)认为讽刺是与后现代世界观密切相关的思想状态,一种从旨在达成共识的判断的退却,或一种不做判断的新共识。但是讽刺的性格最好被理解为美德,一种追求切实可行的成就和道德成功的习性。为了给这种美德下定义,我要把它描述为承认包括自身在内的任何事物的他异性的习惯。不管你多么坚信自己行为的正义性或自己观点的真理性,都能把它们看作别人的行为或观点,并因此对其重新描述。这样定义后,讽刺和嘲讽的区别就非常明显了:它是接受而不是拒绝。这定义也指出了两种方法:通过讽刺,我学会接受被凝视的他人也接受正在凝视他人的自己。按照罗蒂的说法,讽刺不是不做出判断,而是简单地承认进行判断的人也被他人判断,被自己判断。

  我认为西方的民主遗产来自宽恕他人的习惯。宽恕他人就是在心中给予他人未来的自由。因此承认个人对自己生活的主权,可以自由地做正确和错误的事情。因此,为宽恕提供永久空间的社会将自动走向民主,因为在这个社会里,所有影响他的决定在做出的时候都能听到其他人的声音。承认和接受他人的讽刺放大了这种民主倾向,也帮助消融民主文化中的平庸和趋同性等负面因素。

  宽恕和讽刺位于西方文明的核心。它们是我们必须最自豪的东西,是让敌人缴械的最主要手段,构成了建立在同意基础上的公民权概念的基础。宽恕和讽刺在我们的法律概念中的表现是通过发现冲突的公正处理方法而解决冲突的手段。人们常常没有认识到这种法律概念和穆斯林的教法(沙里亚)(sharia)之间的根本区别。沙里亚被认为是真主发出的法令体系,是不能够也不需要被进一步证明的。

  上帝的命令对于基督徒或者犹太教徒也是重要的,但是人们认为依靠它们来对人类社会进行良好的管理是不够的。必须引进另外一种法律来补充,这种法律可根据不同形式的人类冲突采取不同的反应。捐献钱财的寓言说得很清楚:(让恺撒的事归恺撒,让上帝的事归上帝)正如两把剑的教皇原则,好政府也依赖两种法律,人类的法律和上帝的法律。我们的法院执行的法律要求当事人只“屈服”于世俗的裁决,它把任何一方都当作自由采取行动的负责的个人。法律的这个特征特别清楚地体现在说英语国家的人心中,他们的不成文法体制包括了法院必须坚持的自由(公民从国家那里争取到的)。沙里亚包括了法院必须坚持真主提出的义务。正如在古兰经和《圣行》(the Sunna)中显示的,它是确保“服从”真主意志的手段。

  这些思想对我们现在的情形有什么意义呢?特别是,我们求助于犹太教基督教遗产的这些深层内容怎么帮助我们应对伊斯兰恐怖主义造成的威胁,怎么帮助我们既获得迫切需要的与伊斯兰的和解又保证我们的政治遗产安全无虞呢?

  在大众的心里,恐怖主义和伊斯兰是联系在一起的,作为回应,好心的评论家宽慰我们说恐怖主义中没有新东西,容易导致支持者走向恐怖主义的伊斯兰教也没有新东西。难道不是法国大革命中的雅各宾派把野兽从笼子里放出来了吗?恐怖主义难道不是在19世纪的俄罗斯民粹派找到的政治武器,后来又被20世纪的激进运动采用的吗?

  这种反应是有道理的,它同时也促使我们思考更深刻的动机问题。究竟是什么因素驱使人们使用恐怖手段?它是否如辩护者暗示的那样是被作为战术措施使用的还是当作目的本身呢?从某种意义上看,把现代恐怖主义的起源追溯到启蒙运动、人类平等的观念、尼采在现代社会中辨别出来的无名怨愤(ressentiment)态度等是有道理的,这种怨愤就是一种迫切想摧毁别人手里拥有的自己得不到的东西的欲望。但是这种诊断忽略了一个事实,就像以俄罗斯民粹派为代表的恐怖主义(名字的来源)那样的明显与任何目标都没有关系的动机。不错,有时候恐怖分子如布尔什维克或爱尔兰共和军(IRA)、或巴斯克分离主义组织“埃塔”(ETA)会为自己贴上事业的标签,让人们相信随着“无产阶级专政”的成功、统一的爱尔兰、或巴斯克民族国家的实现,在达到目的后,他们就会放下武器。但是这些运动背后的目标往往是模糊的和乌托邦的,是根本无法实现的空想。而无法达到的目标似乎是他们事业的组成部分,是一种为他们不断出现的暴力进行辩护的方式。

  恐怖分子要么完全没有目标,要么投身于非常模糊的具有形而上学特征的事业,没有人(至少他们自己)相信这种目标是可以实现的,正如陀思妥耶夫斯和屠格涅夫描述的那种俄罗斯民粹派。我年轻时候的意大利红色旅(Brigate Rosse)和德国巴德尔·迈因霍夫集团(Baader-Meinhof)也是如此。迈克尔·伯利(Michael Burleigh)在他的权威著作《鲜血和愤怒》中说现代恐怖主义感兴趣的是暴力而不是靠暴力达到的任何目标。约瑟夫·康拉德(Joseph Conrad)在《秘密特工》中描述的对任何破坏都兴高采烈的教授就是这样的典型。

  因此,恐怖主义事业的模糊性和乌托邦特征是它的吸引力的重要组成部分,因为这意味着事业无法定义或者限制行动,它在等待寻求改变自己而不是改变世界的恐怖分子往里面填充意义。你要杀害既没有得罪你又无正当理由受到惩罚的人,就必须相信自己是代表正义的天使,接着要开始把杀戮看作展现你是真正的天使的方法。你的存在得到了最终的本体论证明。

  恐怖分子追求道德上的狂喜,这是一种超越普通人判断能力之外的意识,是只有上帝才享受的那种自信的许可。换句话说,这种恐怖主义是在寻找意义,一种抽象术语下的公民身份所无法提供的意义。即使最世俗的恐怖主义也有一种宗教上的饥渴。

  把无辜的准备去购物的斯密斯太太和她的孩子杀死是非常困难的事,因此这种塑造自我的策略不能简单地从杀戮的欲望,斯密斯太太必须成为别的内容,一种抽象条件的象征和全球敌人的化身。因此,现代的恐怖分子依靠一种学说来除掉目标对象的人性。马克思的理论能非常好地服务于这个目的,因为它创造了资产阶级这个“阶级敌人”的概念。在布尔什维克意识形态里它的功能等同于纳粹意识形态中犹太人的功能。斯密斯太太和孩子站在抽象的资产阶级家庭的目标后面。当炸弹击中这个虚构出来的目标后,弹片碰巧很容易地进入了斯密斯太太的身体。让斯密斯一家感到悲哀的是,你常常听到恐怖分子抽象的道歉,他们说斯密斯太太被炸飞不是他们的错,人们不应该以那样的方式站在目标后面。

  在某种程度上,伊斯兰恐怖分子也同样受到寻找意义的艰难过程所驱使,同样需要站在受害者之上摆出形而上学原则为自己洗刷罪名。自由、平等或者历史权利等概念对他们的思维没有影响,他们对袭击的目标所享受的权力和特权不感兴趣。现实世界的东西对他们来说没有真正价值,如果说他们有时候瞄准权力,那是因为权力能帮助他们建立神的国家。他们像其他人一样知道这个目标是不可能实现的,所以能在屡屡失败后不断重新开始。他们对于他人的性命采取满不在乎的态度,实际上他们对自己的性命同样不当回事。对于他们来说,生活没有特殊的价值,死亡经常在视野的地平线尽头召唤他们。只有在死亡中,他们才看到真正重要的唯一意义。那样的话,他们就可以最终超越这个世界以及世界要求我们履行的对其他人的义务。

  受到排斥一切的文化所熏陶的人不大愿意承认寻找意义是人类的普遍现象,他们倾向于认为所有冲突都是政治性的,关心的都是谁对谁享有控制权。他们倾向于相信造成伊斯兰恐怖主义的原因是恐怖分子所抗议的“社会不公”,因为所有其他寻求纠正的尝试都失败了,这使得恐怖分子这些让人遗憾的方法变得不可避免。在我看来,这种看法完全错误地解释了笼统的恐怖主义和具体的伊斯兰主义的动机。像欧洲民粹派一样,伊斯兰恐怖分子首先感兴趣的是自己的精神状况,他们才不在乎真的去改变尘世里的小事。他们想进入神的世界而不是人的世界,这意味着他们要摧毁包括自己的身体在内的挡在前进道路上的所有障碍来见证神的法律,进入神的王国。死亡是服从的最后行动,通过死亡,他融化成为新的不朽的兄弟情。他的死亡所造成的恐怖不仅提升兄弟情的世界而且给予下面激烈竞争的陌生人世界带来破坏性打击(这个世界的组合原则是公民身份而不是兄弟情谊)。

  这就是为什么我们应该认识到面临的新威胁,它没有局限性也没有可以协商的目标,我们无法轻易地采用军事手段,其他常用手段也根本不起作用。我们不能给伊斯兰分子提供任何让他们能够说达到了自己目标的东西。如果他们成功地用核导弹摧毁了一座西方的城市或者用致命病毒消灭了某个区域的人,他们将认为这是个巨大胜利,虽然它不会带来任何物质的、政治的、宗教的、或别的什么利益。

  当然,普通穆斯林民众会对这样的暴行惊骇不已,会认为像基地组织实施的那种滥杀无辜是真主的法律绝对不允许的罪恶。有些让人鼓舞的迹象显示善于思考的穆斯林在企图找到办法公开承诺与其他两个亚伯拉罕诸教派别和睦共处,要坚持爱邻居的原则,即使邻居的信仰与自己不同。2007年还有140名杰出穆斯林学者签名的对西方宗教领袖的公开信,呼吁不同信仰者的对话,以相互尊重作为共存的基础。但我们应该注意到两个重要的事实。第一,伊斯兰从来没有成功地建立宗教权威的任何决定性资源。每个宗教领袖都是自封的,像霍梅尼(Ayatollah Khomeini)在自己的追随者圈子之外并没有多大的影响力。人们常常说伊斯兰没有自己的新教改革是多么大的遗憾啊。实际上,它是个没有终结的新教改革系列,每个派别都宣称自己是服从真主问题上的唯一真理。

  第二,(我认为与第一条有联系)穆斯林在无视他们以信仰的名义下犯下的种种罪行方面表现惊人,而且攻击任何贬低它的人。臭名昭著的丹麦漫画引起穆斯林的愤怒,把各个地方的穆斯林团结起来采取破坏行动并呼吁报复。几天后,什叶派穆斯林最圣洁的地方之一萨马拉的阿斯卡里清真寺被伊斯兰分子炸掉了。但伊拉克之外的抗议者在哪里呢?伊斯兰恐怖分子杀死的穆斯林比非穆斯林多得多。但是那些宣称为穆斯林讲话的人什么时候提到这些统计数字了呢?因此,糟糕的漫画的整个问题让我们看到的是在先知名义下犯下的罪行。他赞同不赞同这样做呢?

  穆斯林必须面对这个问题。但是根深蒂固的双重标准常常阻碍他们把针对信仰的敌人的义愤转向穆斯林同胞。这种双重标准正是缺乏讽刺能力的直接后果。它们来源于不能接受任何事情的他异性,即站在自己的观点甚至自己的信仰之外把它们当作别人的信仰来看。我不是说在这个方面伊斯兰总缺乏讽刺能力,苏非(Sufi)大师的著作中就充满了讽刺,但苏非大师(我特别想到诗人鲁米(Rumi)和哈菲兹(Hafiz))属于那个被伊斯兰分子抛弃的伟大的认识自己的伊斯兰文化,相反拥抱了阿布德阿·瓦哈卜·布哈里(Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab)的狭隘种族偏见或者穆斯林兄弟社和赛义德·库特布自我欺骗的怀旧情结。

  因此,西方与穆斯林的对抗不是政治上的或经济上的,它不是走向协商或者要求解释的第一步,而是生存的对抗。人家提出的问题是:“你有什么权利存在?”作为回答,我们可能说“什么权利也没有”,同时期待对方接着说“我想也是。”一个回答只有直面问题才能转移威胁,也就是说我们必须彻底说服他们,我们确实存在的权利,我们也愿意承认对方同样有存在的权利,妥协必须是相互的,其他任何策略都没有成功的机会。

  基地组织可能很弱小,摧毁西方的整个阴谋在新保守主义者的头脑里不过是异想天开的幻想而已,这些保守派在自由派的头脑里同样是异想天开的人。但是威胁确实并非来自阴谋或者某个组织,而是来自我们不完全明白的经受伤痛经历的个人,那些没有宽恕和讽刺两个天赋的穆斯林移民遭遇现代世界的经历。这样的人是无法预测和无法理解的环境下出现的无法预测的副产品,到现在为止我们对他的动机的了解表明没有任何政策能震慑恐怖袭击。

  那么,在生存对抗中我们的立场应该是什么呢?我认为,我们应该强调从祖先那里继承下来宽容美德和成就,表现出批评和纠正所有罪恶的意愿,我们知道需要改善的空间很大。我们应该复兴洛克对自由和许可的区分。我们应该让孩子们彻底明白自由是一种秩序,不是无政府主义或者自我放任的许可。我们应该停止嘲笑父母或者祖父母看重的东西,应该自豪于他们取得的成就。这不是傲慢而是对于我们基本权利的公正认可。

  我们也应该放弃造成西方公共生活困惑的所有多元文化主义的模棱两可,重新确认西方传统中社会成员的核心价值,即公民权的观点。我们要发出相信自己所拥有的东西的信号,我们愿意与人分享,但不愿意让它遭到破坏。这是我们所能做的唯一可以化解当今冲突的事。因为宽恕是西方文化的核心,发出这个信号已经足够了,即使我们用讽刺的精神表达出来。

  译自:Forgiveness and Irony Roger Scruton

  罗杰·斯克鲁顿(Roger Scruton)作家和哲学家。本文选自他在加拿大卡尔加里(Calgary)大学西方文明推进麦克尼什讲座(McNish Lecture)上的演讲。

  http://www.city-journal.org/2009/19_1_the-west.html

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