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Custom and Myth, by Andrew Lang

Custom and Myth, by Andrew Lang

安德鲁·郎的名头在神话学历史上可是响当当的,
当年就是他单枪匹马把马克斯·缪勒挑到了马下。
他的人类学神话学对中国现代神话学产生了深远的影响,
周作人、茅盾都介绍过他,
茅盾的《神话研究》基本上就是照着郎的葫芦画的瓢,
不过他的书好像迄今尚无译为中文者,
所以送给大家一本英文版。

[ 本帖最后由 刘宗迪 于 2010-5-6 22:41 编辑 ]
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  • 耿羽 宝葫芦 +9 2010-5-7 10:15
  • 耿羽 +9 2010-5-7 10:15

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有了。

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我一直想把这本书译过来。
所以还特意复印了它的纸本。
马克斯·缪勒尔的比较神话学有汉译本了。
但人类学神话好像还没有汉译本。
泰勒《原始文化》、弗拉泽尔《金色树枝》那些不是专门的神话学著作。
所以龙们如果要练习翻译,不妨拿这本书练手。

[ 本帖最后由 刘宗迪 于 2010-5-6 23:02 编辑 ]

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[存档]周作人:习俗与神话

《夜读抄》

周作人


03.习俗与神话
   
    一九○七年即清光绪丁未在日本,始翻译英国哈葛德安度阑二人合著小说,原名《世界欲》(The World's Desire)。改题曰《红星佚史》,在上海出板。那时哈葛德的神怪冒险各小说经侯官林氏译出,风行一世,我的选择也就逃不出这个范围,但是特别选取这册《世界欲》的原因却又别有所在,这就是那合著者安度阑其人。安度阑即安特路朗(Andrew Lang 1844—1912),是人类学派的神话学家的祖师。他的著作很多,那时我所有的是《银文库》本的一册《习俗与神话》(Custom and Myth)和两册《神话仪式与宗教》(Myth Ritual and Religion),还有一小册得阿克利多斯牧歌译本。《世界欲》是一部半埃及半希腊的神怪小说,神怪固然是哈葛德的拿手好戏,其神话及古典文学一方面有了朗氏做顾问,当然很可凭信,因此便决定了我的选择了。“哈氏丛书”以后我渐渐地疏远了,朗氏的著作却还是放在座右,虽然并不是全属于神话的。
    十九世纪中间缪勒博士(Max Müller)以言语之病解释神话,一时言语学派的势力甚大,但是里边不无谬误,后经人类学派的指摘随即坍台,人类学派代之而兴,而当初在英国发难者即是朗氏。据路易斯宾思(Lewis Spence)的《神话概论》引朗氏自己的话说,读了缪勒的书发生好些疑惑,“重要的理由是,缪勒用了亚利安族的言语,大抵是希腊拉丁斯拉夫与梵文的语源说,来解释希腊神话,可是我却在红印第安人,卡非耳人,爱思吉摩人,萨摩耶特人,卡米拉罗人,玛阿里和卡洛克人中间,都找到与希腊的非常近似的神话。现在假如亚利安神话起源由于亚利安族言语之病,那么这是很奇怪的,为甚在非亚利安族言语通行的地方会有这些如此相像的神话呢。难道是有一种言语上的疹子,同样地传染了一切言语自梵文以至却克多语,到处在宗教与神话上留下同样的难看的疤痕的么?”在语言系统不同的民族里都有类似的神话传说,说这神话的起源都由于言语的传讹,这在事实上是不会有的。不过如言语学派的方法既不能解释神话里的那荒唐不合理的事件,那么怎样才能把他解释过来呢?朗氏在《习俗与神话》的第一篇《论民俗学的方法》中云:
    “对于这些奇异的风俗,民俗学的方法是怎样的呢?这方法是,如在一国见有显是荒唐怪异的习俗,要去找到别一国,在那里也有类似的习俗,但是在那里不特并不荒唐怪异,却与那人民的礼仪思想相合。希腊人在密宗仪式里两手拿了不毒的蛇跳舞,看去完全不可解。但红印第安人做同样的事,用了真的响尾蛇试验勇气,我们懂得红人的动机,而且可以猜想在希腊人的祖先或者也有相类的动机存在。所以我们的方法是以开化民族的似乎无意义的习俗或礼仪去与未开化民族中间所有类似的而仍留存着原来意义的习俗或礼仪相比较。这种比较上那未开化的与开化的民族并不限于同系统的,也不必要证明他们曾经有过接触。类似的心理状态发生类似的行为,在种族的同一或思想礼仪的借用以外。”
    《神话仪式与宗教》第一章中云:“我们主要的事是在寻找历史上的表示人智某一种状态的事实,神话中我们视为荒唐的分子在那时看来很是合理。假如我们能够证明如此心理状态在人间确是广泛的存在,而且曾经存在,那么这种心理状态可以暂被认为那些神话的源泉,凡是现代的心地明白的人所觉得难懂的神话便都从此而出。又如能证明这心理状态为一切文明种族所曾经过,则此神话创作的心理状态之普遍存在一事将可以说明此类故事的普遍分布的一部分理由。”关于分布说诸家尚有意见,似乎朗氏所说有太泛处,惟神话创作的心理状态作为许多难懂的荒唐故事解释的枢机大致妥当,至今学者多承其说,所见英人讲童话的书亦均如此。同书第三章论野蛮人的心理状态,列举其特色有五,即一万物同等,均有生命与知识,二信法术,三信鬼魂,四好奇,五轻信,并说明如下:
    “我们第一见到的是那一种渺茫混杂的心境,觉得一切东西,凡有生或无生,凡人,兽,植物或无机物,似乎都有同样的生命情感以及理知。至少在所谓神话创作时期,野蛮人对于自己和世间万物的中间并不划出强固的界线。他老实承认自己与一切动物植物及天体有亲属关系,就是石头岩石也有性别与生殖力,日月星辰与风均有人类的感情和言语,不仅鸟兽鱼类为然。
    “其次可注意的是他们的相信法术与符咒。这世界与其中万物仿佛都是有感觉有知识的,所以听从部落中某一种人的命令,如酋长,术士,巫师,或随你说是谁。在他们命令之下,岩石分开,河水开涸,禽兽给他们当奴仆,和他们谈话。术士能致病或医病,还能命令天气,随意下雨或打雷。希腊人所说驱云的宙斯或亚坡罗的形容词殆无不可以加于部落术士之上。因为世间万物与人性质相通之故,正如宙斯或因陀罗一样术士能够随意变化任何兽形,或将他的邻人或仇人变成兽身。
    “野蛮人信仰之别—特相与上述甚有关系。野蛮人非常相信死人鬼魂之长久的存在。这些鬼魂保存许多他们的旧性,但是他们在死后常比生存在世时性情更为凶恶。他们常听术士的号召,用他们的忠告和法力去帮助他。又如上文所说因为人与兽的密切的关系,死人的鬼魂时常转居于动物身内,或转变为某种生物,各部落自认为与有亲属的或友谊的关系者是也。如普通神话信仰的矛盾的常态,有时讲起鬼魂似住在另一鬼世界里,有时是花的乐园,有时又是幽暗的地方,生人偶然可到,但假如尝了鬼的食物那便再不能逃出来了。
    “与精灵相关的另有一种野蛮哲理流行甚广。一切东西相信都有鬼魂,无论是有生或无生物,又凡一个人的精神或气力常被视为另一物件,可以寄托在别的东西里,或存在自身的某一地方。人的气力或精神可以住在肾脏脂肪内,在心脏内,在一缕头发内,而且又还可以收藏在别的器具内。时常有人能够使他的灵魂离开身体,放出去游行给他去办事,有时化作一鸟或别的兽形。
    “好些别的信仰尚可列举,例如普通对于友谊的或保护的兽之信仰,又相信我们所谓自然的死大抵都是非自然的,凡死大抵都是敌对的鬼神或术士之所为。从这意见里便发生那种神话,说人类本来是不会死的,因为一种错误或是过失,死遂被引入人间来了。
    “野蛮人心理状态还有—特相应当说明。与文明人相像,野蛮人是好奇的。科学精神的最初的微弱激动已经在他脑里发作,他对于他所见的世界急于想找到一种解说。但是,他的好奇心有时并不强于他的轻信。他的智力急于发问,正与儿童的脾气相同,可是他的智力又颇懒惰,碰到一个问答便即满足了。他从旧传里得到问题的答案,或者有一新问题起来的时候,他自己造一个故事来作回答。正如梭格拉底在柏拉图问答篇内理论讲不通时便想起或造出一篇神话来,野蛮人对于他自己所想到的各问题也都有一篇故事当作答案。这些故事所以可以说是科学的,因为想去解决许多宇宙之谜。这又可以说是宗教的,因为这里大抵有一超自然的力,有如戏台上的神道,出来解决问题的纠结。这种故事所以是野蛮人的科学,一方面又是宗教的传说。”
    朗氏解释神话的根据和方法大概如是,虽然后来各家有更精密或稍殊异的说法,因为最早读朗氏之说,印象最深,故述其略,其他便不多说了。朗氏主要的地位在于人类学及考古学,但一方面也是文人。华扣(Hugh Walker)在所著《英国论文及论文家》第十二章中有一节说得很好,今全抄于后:
    “安特路朗是这样一个人,他似乎是具备着做一个大论文家所需要的一切材力的。他的知识愈广,论文家也就愈有话说,而朗氏在知识广博上是少有人能够超越过他的了。他是古典学者,他关于历史及文学很是博览,他擅长人类学,他能研究讨论鬼与巫术。他又是猎人,熟悉野外的生活不亚于书房里的生活。在他多方面的智力活动的范围内,超越他过的或者有几个人,却也只有几个人。两三个人读书或更广博,两三个人或者更深的钻到苏格阑历史的小径里去。但是那些有时候纠正他的专门家却多不大能够利用他们优长的知识。而且即使他们的知识在某一点占了优势,但在全体上大抵总很显得不及。朗氏有他们所最缺乏的一件本事,即是流利优雅的文体。他显示出这优胜来无过于最近所著的一本书即《英国文学史》。要把这国文学的故事紧缩起来收在一册不大的书里,而且又写得这样好,每页都漂亮可读,这实在是大胜利。这册书又表明朗氏有幽默的天才,在论文家这是非常重要的。这里到处都可看出,他并不反对,还简直有点喜欢,发表他个人的秘密。读他的书的人不久便即明瞭,他是爱司各得的,还爱司各得的国,这也就是他的故国,他又对于鬼怪出现的事是很有兴趣的。总而言之,朗氏似乎满具了论文家应有的才能了。但是我们却得承认,当作一个论文家来说他是有点缺恨的。题材虽然很多变化,风格很是愉快,可是其间总缺少一点什么东西,不能完全成功。无论我们拿起那一本书来,或《小论文》,或《垂钓漫录》,或《失了的领袖》,或《与故文人书》,读后留下的印象是很愉快的,但是并不深。这些不是永久生存的文学,在各该方面差不多都有超过他的,虽然作者的才能或反不及朗氏。这一部分的理由的确是因为他做的事情太多。他的心老是忙着别的事情,论文只是他的副产物。这些多是刊物性的,不大是文学性的。恐怕就是兰姆的文章也会得如此,假如他一生继续的在那里弄别的大工作。”
    英国批评家戈斯在论文集《影画》(Edmund Gosse silhouettes)中论朗氏的诗的一篇文章上也说:“他有百十种兴趣,这都轮流的来感发他的诗兴,却并没有一种永久占据他的心思,把别种排除掉,他们各个乃是不断的重复出现。”这所说的与上文意思大旨相同,可知华扣的褒贬是颇中肯的。当作纯粹文人论,他的不精一的缺点诚然是有,不过在我个人的私见上这在一方面也未始不是好处。因为那有多方面的知识的文章别有一种风趣,也非纯粹文人所能作;还有所谓钻到学术的小径里去的笔录,离开纯文艺自然更远一步了,我却也觉得很是喜欢的。朗氏著作中有一卷《历史上的怪事件》(Historical Mysteries),一共十六篇,我从前很喜欢看以至于今,这是一种偏好罢,不见有人赞同,对于日本森鸥外的著作我也如此,他的《山房札记》以及好些医家传也是我所常常翻看的,大约比翻看他的小说的时候还要多一点也未可知。
    朗氏的文学成绩我一点都不能介绍,但在《世界欲》的书里共有诗长短约二十首,不知怎么我就认定是他的手笔,虽然并无从证明哈葛德必不能作,现在仍旧依照从前幼稚的推测,抄录一二首于下,以见一斑。这一首在第二编第五章《厉祠》【1】里,是女神所唱的情歌,翻译用的是古文,因为这是二十六七年前的事了。
    婉婉问欢兮,问欢情之向谁,
    相思相失兮,惟夫君其有之。
    载辞旧欢兮,梦痕溘其都尽,
    载离长眠兮,为夫君而终醒。
    恶梦袭斯匡床兮,深宵见兹大魅,
    鬘汝欢以新生兮,兼幽情与古爱。
    胡恶梦大魅为兮,惟圣且神,
    相思相失兮,忍予死以待君。
    又一首见第三篇第七章《阿迭修斯最后之战》中,勒尸多列庚(Laestrygon)蛮族挥巨斧作战歌,此名见于荷马史诗,学者谓即古代北欧人,故歌中云冬无昼云云也。
    勒尸多列庚,是我种族名。
    吾侪生乡无庐舍,冬来无昼夏无夜。
    海边森森有松树,松枝下,好居住。
    有时趁风波,还去逐天鹅。
    我父希尼号狼人,狼即是我名。
    我拏舟,向南泊,满船载琉珀。
    行船到处见生客,赢得浪花当财帛。
    黄金多,战声好,更有女郎就吾抱。
    我语汝,汝莫嗔,会当杀汝隳【2】城人。
   
    附记
    民国二十年冬曾写过一篇《习俗与神话》,寄给东方杂志社预备登在三月上旬的报上,不久战事起,原稿付之一炬,这两年来虽然屡次想补写,却总捏不起笔来,而且内容也大半忘记,无从追忆了。这回决心重写,差不多是新作一样,因为上述关系仍列为第三。
    二十二年十二月十一日于北平。
   
    (1934年1月刊《青年界》5卷1号,署名岂明)
   
    肖毛注:
    【1】《厉祠》,止庵先生编《红星佚史》(新星出版社2006年初版)正文中题作“戾祠”。按,“厉祠”的原文是“The Chapel Perilous”。其中,“Perilous”的意思是“危险的”,“厉”也有此意,“戾”却没有这个意思。
    【2】岳麓版作“隳城”,河北教育版作“堕城”。按,“我语汝,汝莫嗔,会当杀汝隳城人”的原文为“Soon shall I slay thee, of Cities!"”,大意是“我将杀死你们,把城市洗劫一空”。“我语汝,汝莫嗔”大约是知堂为了赶韵自行添加的,实不该有;原文中的Sacker意思是“劫掠者”,“隳”的意思是“破坏”,与之意思相似。但是,“隳”与“堕”字又是相同的,用哪个都一样。我看止庵先生编《红星佚史》中的译文也是“隳城”,故采用此字。
    另,“赢得浪花当财帛”的原文是“Winning me wave-flame”,英文版对“wave-flame”一词注释为“Gold”,即金子,不知有何典故。不管怎样,译成“赢得浪花当财帛”,意思是很奇怪的。翻译用古文的好处是典雅有味,但为了典雅和赶韵,译者往往把明白的意思变得模糊,甚至自行增删一些原文中没有的东西,这便是古文译法的弊病了。所以,知堂后来才改用白话文翻译。但若因此将林纾式的译文一笔抹杀,却又走入另一个极端了。人生的趣味在于冲突与调和,作文和翻译也一样,都不能走极端。
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  • 耿羽 宝葫芦 +3 2010-5-7 10:15
  • 耿羽 +3 2010-5-7 10:15

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INTRODUCTION.

INTRODUCTION.

Though some of the essays in this volume have appeared in various serials, the majority of them were written expressly for their present purpose, and they are now arranged in a designed order.  During some years of study of Greek, Indian, and savage mythologies, I have become more and more impressed with a sense of the inadequacy of the prevalent method of comparative mythology.  That method is based on the belief that myths are the result of a disease of language, as the pearl is the result of a disease of the oyster.  It is argued that men at some period, or periods, spoke in a singular style of coloured and concrete language, and that their children retained the phrases of this language after losing hold of the original meaning.  The consequence was the growth of myths about supposed persons, whose names had originally been mere ‘appellations.’  In conformity with this hypothesis the method of comparative mythology examines the proper names which occur in myths.  The notion is that these names contain a key to the meaning of the story, and that, in fact, of the story the names are the germs and the oldest surviving part.

The objections to this method are so numerous that it is difficult to state them briefly.  The attempt, however, must be made.  To desert the path opened by the most eminent scholars is in itself presumptuous; the least that an innovator can do is to give his reasons for advancing in a novel direction.  If this were a question of scholarship merely, it would be simply foolhardy to differ from men like Max Müller, Adalbert Kuhn, Bréal, and many others.  But a revolutionary mythologist is encouraged by finding that these scholars usually differ from each other.  Examples will be found chiefly in the essays styled ‘The Myth of Cronus,’ ‘A Far-travelled Tale,’ and ‘Cupid and Psyche.’  Why, then, do distinguished scholars and mythologists reach such different goals?  Clearly because their method is so precarious.  They all analyse the names in myths; but, where one scholar decides that the name is originally Sanskrit, another holds that it is purely Greek, and a third, perhaps, is all for an Accadian etymology, or a Semitic derivation.  Again, even when scholars agree as to the original root from which a name springs, they differ as much as ever as to the meaning of the name in its present place.  The inference is, that the analysis of names, on which the whole edifice of philological ‘comparative mythology’ rests, is a foundation of shifting sand.  The method is called ‘orthodox,’ but, among those who practise it, there is none of the beautiful unanimity of orthodoxy.

These objections are not made by the unscholarly anthropologist alone.  Curtius has especially remarked the difficulties which beset the ‘etymological operation’ in the case of proper names.  ‘Peculiarly dubious and perilous is mythological etymology.  Are we to seek the sources of the divine names in aspects of nature, or in moral conceptions; in special Greek geographical conditions, or in natural circumstances which are everywhere the same: in dawn with her rays, or in clouds with their floods; are we to seek the origin of the names of heroes in things historical and human, or in physical phenomena?’ {3a}  Professor Tiele, of Leyden, says much the same thing: ‘The uncertainties are great, and there is a constant risk of taking mere jeux d’esprit for scientific results.’ {3b}  Every name has, if we can discover or conjecture it, a meaning.  That meaning—be it ‘large’ or ‘small,’ ‘loud’ or ‘bright,’ ‘wise’ or ‘dark,’ ‘swift’ or ‘slow’—is always capable of being explained as an epithet of the sun, or of the cloud, or of both.  Whatever, then, a name may signify, some scholars will find that it originally denoted the cloud, if they belong to one school, or the sun or dawn, if they belong to another faction.  Obviously this process is a mere jeu d’esprit.  This logic would be admitted in no other science, and, by similar arguments, any name whatever might be shown to be appropriate to a solar hero.

The scholarly method has now been applied for many years, and what are the results?  The ideas attained by the method have been so popularised that they are actually made to enter into the education of children, and are published in primers and catechisms of mythology.  But what has a discreet scholar to say to the whole business?  ‘The difficult task of interpreting mythical names has, so far, produced few certain results’—so writes Otto Schrader. {4} Though Schrader still has hopes of better things, it is admitted that the present results are highly disputable.  In England, where one set of these results has become an article of faith, readers chiefly accept the opinions of a single etymological school, and thus escape the difficulty of making up their minds when scholars differ.  But differ scholars do, so widely and so often, that scarcely any solid advantages have been gained in mythology from the philological method.

The method of philological mythology is thus discredited by the disputes of its adherents.  The system may be called orthodox, but it is an orthodoxy which alters with every new scholar who enters the sacred enclosure.  Even were there more harmony, the analysis of names could throw little light on myths.  In stories the names may well be, and often demonstrably are, the latest, not the original, feature.  Tales, at first told of ‘Somebody,’ get new names attached to them, and obtain a new local habitation, wherever they wander.  ‘One of the leading personages to be met in the traditions of the world is really no more than—Somebody.  There is nothing this wondrous creature cannot achieve; one only restriction binds him at all—that the name he assumes shall have some sort of congruity with the office he undertakes, and even from this he oftentimes breaks loose.’ {5}  We may be pretty sure that the adventures of Jason, Perseus, Œdipous, were originally told only of ‘Somebody.’  The names are later additions, and vary in various lands.  A glance at the essay on ‘Cupid and Psyche’ will show that a history like theirs is known, where neither they nor their counterparts in the Veda, Urvasi and Pururavas, were ever heard of; while the incidents of the Jason legend are familiar where no Greek word was ever spoken.  Finally, the names in common use among savages are usually derived from natural phenomena, often from clouds, sky, sun, dawn.  If, then, a name in a myth can be proved to mean cloud, sky, sun, or what not (and usually one set of scholars find clouds, where others see the dawn), we must not instantly infer that the myth is a nature-myth.  Though, doubtless, the heroes in it were never real people, the names are as much common names of real people in the savage state, as Smith and Brown are names of civilised men.

For all these reasons, but chiefly because of the fact that stories are usually anonymous at first, that names are added later, and that stories naturally crystallise round any famous name, heroic, divine, or human, the process of analysis of names is most precarious and untrustworthy.  A story is told of Zeus: Zeus means sky, and the story is interpreted by scholars as a sky myth.  The modern interpreter forgets, first, that to the myth-maker sky did not at all mean the same thing as it means to him.  Sky meant, not an airy, infinite, radiant vault, but a person, and, most likely, a savage person.  Secondly, the interpreter forgets that the tale (say the tale of Zeus, Demeter, and the mutilated Ram) may have been originally anonymous, and only later attributed to Zeus, as unclaimed jests are attributed to Sheridan or Talleyrand.  Consequently no heavenly phenomena will be the basis and explanation of the story.  If one thing in mythology be certain, it is that myths are always changing masters, that the old tales are always being told with new names.  Where, for example, is the value of a philological analysis of the name of Jason?  As will be seen in the essay ‘A Far-travelled Tale,’ the analysis of the name of Jason is fanciful, precarious, disputed, while the essence of his myth is current in Samoa, Finland, North America, Madagascar, and other lands, where the name was never heard, and where the characters in the story have other names or are anonymous.

For these reasons, and others too many to be adduced here, I have ventured to differ from the current opinion that myths must be interpreted chiefly by philological analysis of names.  The system adopted here is explained in the first essay, called ‘The Method of Folklore.’  The name, Folklore, is not a good one, but ‘comparative mythology’ is usually claimed exclusively by the philological interpreters.

The second essay, ‘The Bull-Roarer,’ is intended to show that certain peculiarities in the Greek mysteries occur also in the mysteries of savages, and that on Greek soil they are survivals of savagery.

‘The Myth of Cronus’ tries to prove that the first part of the legend is a savage nature-myth, surviving in Greek religion, while the sequel is a set of ideas common to savages.

‘Cupid and Psyche’ traces another Aryan myth among savage races, and attempts to show that the myth may have had its origin in a rule of barbarous etiquette.

‘A Far-travelled Tale’ examines a part of the Jason myth.  This myth appears neither to be an explanation of natural phenomena (like part of the Myth of Cronus), nor based on a widespread custom (like Cupid and Psyche.)  The question is asked whether the story may have been diffused by slow filtration from race to race all over the globe, as there seems no reason why it should have been invented separately (as a myth explanatory of natural phenomena or of customs might be) in many different places.

‘Apollo and the Mouse’ suggests hypothetically, as a possible explanation of the tie between the God and the Beast, that Apollo-worship superseded, but did not eradicate, Totemism.  The suggestion is little more than a conjecture.

‘Star Myths’ points out that Greek myths of stars are a survival from the savage stage of fancy in which such stories are natural.

‘Moly and Mandragora’ is a study of the Greek, the modern, and the Hottentot folklore of magical herbs, with a criticism of a scholarly and philological hypothesis, according to which Moly is the dog-star, and Circe the moon.

‘The Kalevala’ is an account of the Finnish national poem; of all poems that in which the popular, as opposed to the artistic, spirit is strongest.  The Kalevala is thus a link between Märchen and Volkslieder on one side, and epic poetry on the other.

‘The Divining Rod’ is a study of a European and civilised superstition, which is singular in its comparative lack of copious savage analogues.

‘Hottentot Mythology’ is a criticism of the philological method, applied to savage myth.

‘Fetichism and the Infinite,’ is a review of Mr. Max Müller’s theory that a sense of the Infinite is the germ of religion, and that Fetichism is secondary, and a corruption.  This essay also contains a defence of the evidence on which the anthropological method relies.

The remaining essays are studies of the ‘History of the Family,’ and of ‘Savage Art.’

The essay on ‘Savage Art’ is reprinted, by the kind permission of Messrs. Cassell & Co., from two numbers (April and May, 1882) of the Magazine of Art.  I have to thank the editors and publishers of the Contemporary Review, the Cornhill Magazine, and Fraser’s Magazine, for leave to republish ‘The Early History of the Family,’ ‘The Divining Rod,’ and ‘Star Myths,’ and ‘The Kalevala.’  A few sentences in ‘The Bull-Roarer,’ and ‘Hottentot Mythology,’ appeared in essays in the Saturday Review, and some lines of ‘The Method of Folklore’ in the Guardian.  To the editors of those journals also I owe thanks for their courteous permission to make this use of my old articles.

To Mr. E. B. Tylor and Mr. W. R. S. Ralston I must express my gratitude for the kindness with which they have always helped me in all difficulties.

I must apologise for the controversial matter in the volume.  Controversy is always a thing to be avoided, but, in this particular case, when a system opposed to the prevalent method has to be advocated, controversy is unavoidable.  My respect for the learning of my distinguished adversaries is none the less great because I am not convinced by their logic, and because my doubts are excited by their differences.

Perhaps, it should be added, that these essays are, so to speak, only flint-flakes from a neolithic workshop.  This little book merely skirmishes (to change the metaphor) in front of a much more methodical attempt to vindicate the anthropological interpretation of myths.  But lack of leisure and other causes make it probable that my ‘Key to All Mythologies’ will go the way of Mr. Casaubon’s treatise

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THE METHOD OF FOLKLORE.

After the heavy rain of a thunderstorm has washed the soil, it sometimes happens that a child, or a rustic, finds a wedge-shaped piece of metal or a few triangular flints in a field or near a road.  There was no such piece of metal, there were no such flints, lying there yesterday, and the finder is puzzled about the origin of the objects on which he has lighted.  He carries them home, and the village wisdom determines that the wedge-shaped piece of metal is a ‘thunderbolt,’ or that the bits of flint are ‘elf-shots,’ the heads of fairy arrows.  Such things are still treasured in remote nooks of England, and the ‘thunderbolt’ is applied to cure certain maladies by its touch.

As for the fairy arrows, we know that even in ancient Etruria they were looked on as magical, for we sometimes see their points set, as amulets, in the gold of Etruscan necklaces.  In Perugia the arrowheads are still sold as charms.  All educated people, of course, have long been aware that the metal wedge is a celt, or ancient bronze axe-head, and that it was not fairies, but the forgotten peoples of this island who used the arrows with the tips of flint.  Thunder is only so far connected with them that the heavy rains loosen the surface soil, and lay bare its long hidden secrets.

There is a science, Archæology, which collects and compares the material relics of old races, the axes and arrow-heads.  There is a form of study, Folklore, which collects and compares the similar but immaterial relics of old races, the surviving superstitions and stories, the ideas which are in our time but not of it.  Properly speaking, folklore is only concerned with the legends, customs, beliefs, of the Folk, of the people, of the classes which have least been altered by education, which have shared least in progress.  But the student of folklore soon finds that these unprogressive classes retain many of the beliefs and ways of savages, just as the Hebridean people use spindle-whorls of stone, and bake clay pots without the aid of the wheel, like modern South Sea Islanders, or like their own prehistoric ancestors. {11a}  The student of folklore is thus led to examine the usages, myths, and ideas of savages, which are still retained, in rude enough shape, by the European peasantry.  Lastly, he observes that a few similar customs and ideas survive in the most conservative elements of the life of educated peoples, in ritual, ceremonial, and religious traditions and myths.  Though such remains are rare in England, we may note the custom of leading the dead soldier’s horse behind his master to the grave, a relic of days when the horse would have been sacrificed. {11b}  We may observe the persistence of the ceremony by which the monarch, at his coronation, takes his seat on the sacred stone of Scone, probably an ancient fetich stone.  Not to speak, here, of our own religious traditions, the old vein of savage rite and belief is found very near the surface of ancient Greek religion.  It needs but some stress of circumstance, something answering to the storm shower that reveals the flint arrow-heads, to bring savage ritual to the surface of classical religion.  In sore need, a human victim was only too likely to be demanded; while a feast-day, or a mystery, set the Greeks dancing serpent-dances or bear-dances like Red Indians, or swimming with sacred pigs, or leaping about in imitation of wolves, or holding a dog-feast, and offering dog’s flesh to the gods. {12}  Thus the student of folklore soon finds that he must enlarge his field, and examine, not only popular European story and practice, but savage ways and ideas, and the myths and usages of the educated classes in civilised races.  In this extended sense the term ‘folklore’ will frequently be used in the following essays.  The idea of the writer is that mythology cannot fruitfully be studied apart from folklore, while some knowledge of anthropology is required in both sciences.

The science of Folklore, if we may call it a science, finds everywhere, close to the surface of civilised life, the remains of ideas as old as the stone elf-shots, older than the celt of bronze.  In proverbs and riddles, and nursery tales and superstitions, we detect the relics of a stage of thought, which is dying out in Europe, but which still exists in many parts of the world.  Now, just as the flint arrow-heads are scattered everywhere, in all the continents and isles, and everywhere are much alike, and bear no very definite marks of the special influence of race, so it is with the habits and legends investigated by the student of folklore.  The stone arrow-head buried in a Scottish cairn is like those which were interred with Algonquin chiefs.  The flints found in Egyptian soil, or beside the tumulus on the plain of Marathon, nearly resemble the stones which tip the reed arrow of the modern Samoyed.  Perhaps only a skilled experience could discern, in a heap of such arrow-heads, the specimens which are found in America or Africa from those which are unearthed in Europe.  Even in the products of more advanced industry, we see early pottery, for example, so closely alike everywhere that, in the British Museum, Mexican vases have, ere now, been mixed up on the same shelf with archaic vessels from Greece.  In the same way, if a superstition or a riddle were offered to a student of folklore, he would have much difficulty in guessing its provenance, and naming the race from which it was brought.  Suppose you tell a folklorist that, in a certain country, when anyone sneezes, people say ‘Good luck to you,’ the student cannot say à priori what country you refer to, what race you have in your thoughts.  It may be Florida, as Florida was when first discovered; it may be Zululand, or West Africa, or ancient Rome, or Homeric Greece, or Palestine.  In all these, and many other regions, the sneeze was welcomed as an auspicious omen.  The little superstition is as widely distributed as the flint arrow-heads.  Just as the object and use of the arrow-heads became intelligible when we found similar weapons in actual use among savages, so the salutation to the sneezer becomes intelligible when we learn that the savage has a good reason for it.  He thinks the sneeze expels an evil spirit.  Proverbs, again, and riddles are as universally scattered, and the Wolufs puzzle over the same devinettes as the Scotch schoolboy or the Breton peasant.  Thus, for instance, the Wolufs of Senegal ask each other, ‘What flies for ever, and rests never?’—Answer, ‘The Wind.’  ‘Who are the comrades that always fight, and never hurt each other?’—‘The Teeth.’  In France, as we read in the ‘Recueil de Calembours,’ the people ask, ‘What runs faster than a horse, crosses water, and is not wet?’—Answer, ‘The Sun.’  The Samoans put the riddle, ‘A man who stands between two ravenous fishes?’—Answer, ‘The tongue between the teeth.’  Again, ‘There are twenty brothers, each with a hat on his head?’—Answer, ‘Fingers and toes, with nails for hats.’  This is like the French ‘un père a douze fils?’—‘l’an.’  A comparison of M. Rolland’s ‘Devinettes’ with the Woluf conundrums of Boilat, the Samoan examples in Turner’s’ Samoa,’ and the Scotch enigmas collected by Chambers, will show the identity of peasant and savage humour.

A few examples, less generally known, may be given to prove that the beliefs of folklore are not peculiar to any one race or stock of men.  The first case is remarkable: it occurs in Mexico and Ceylon—nor are we aware that it is found elsewhere.  In Macmillan’s Magazine {15} is published a paper by Mrs. Edwards, called ‘The Mystery of the Pezazi.’  The events described in this narrative occurred on August 28, 1876, in a bungalow some thirty miles from Badiella.  The narrator occupied a new house on an estate called Allagalla.  Her native servants soon asserted that the place was haunted by a Pezazi.  The English visitors saw and heard nothing extraordinary till a certain night: an abridged account of what happened then may be given in the words of Mrs. Edwards:—

Wrapped in dreams, I lay on the night in question tranquilly sleeping, but gradually roused to a perception that discordant sounds disturbed the serenity of my slumber.  Loth to stir, I still dozed on, the sounds, however, becoming, as it seemed, more determined to make themselves heard; and I awoke to the consciousness that they proceeded from a belt of adjacent jungle, and resembled the noise that would be produced by some person felling timber.

Shutting my ears to the disturbance, I made no sign, until, with an expression of impatience, E--- suddenly started up, when I laid a detaining grasp upon his arm, murmuring that there was no need to think of rising at present—it must be quite early, and the kitchen cooly was doubtless cutting fire-wood in good time.  E--- responded, in a tone of slight contempt, that no one could be cutting fire-wood at that hour, and the sounds were more suggestive of felling jungle; and he then inquired how long I had been listening to them.  Now thoroughly aroused, I replied that I had heard the sounds for some time, at first confusing them with my dreams, but soon sufficiently awakening to the fact that they were no mere phantoms of my imagination, but a reality.  During our conversation the noises became more distinct and loud; blow after blow resounded, as of the axe descending upon the tree, followed by the crash of the falling timber.  Renewed blows announced the repetition of the operations on another tree, and continued till several were devastated.

It is unnecessary to tell more of the tale.  In spite of minute examinations and close search, no solution of the mystery of the noises, on this or any other occasion, was ever found.  The natives, of course, attributed the disturbance to the Pezazi, or goblin.  No one, perhaps, has asserted that the Aztecs were connected by ties of race with the people of Ceylon.  Yet, when the Spaniards conquered Mexico, and when Sahagun (one of the earliest missionaries) collected the legends of the people, he found them, like the Cingalese, strong believers in the mystic tree-felling.  We translate Sahagun’s account of the ‘midnight axe’:—

When so any man heareth the sound of strokes in the night, as if one were felling trees, he reckons it an evil boding.  And this sound they call youaltepuztli (youalli, night; and tepuztli, copper), which signifies ‘the midnight hatchet.’  This noise cometh about the time of the first sleep, when all men slumber soundly, and the night is still.  The sound of strokes smitten was first noted by the temple-servants, called tlamacazque, at the hour when they go in the night to make their offering of reeds or of boughs of pine, for so was their custom, and this penance they did on the neighbouring hills, and that when the night was far spent.  Whenever they heard such a sound as one makes when he splits wood with an axe (a noise that may be heard afar off), they drew thence an omen of evil, and were afraid, and said that the sounds were part of the witchery of Tezeatlipoca, that often thus dismayeth men who journey in the night.  Now, when tidings of these things came to a certain brave man, one exercised in war, he drew near, being guided by the sound, till he came to the very cause of the hubbub.  And when he came upon it, with difficulty he caught it, for the thing was hard to catch: natheless at last he overtook that which ran before him; and behold, it was a man without a heart, and, on either side of the chest, two holes that opened and shut, and so made the noise.  Then the man put his hand within the breast of the figure and grasped the breast and shook it hard, demanding some grace or gift.

As a rule, the grace demanded was power to make captives in war.  The curious coincidence of the ‘midnight axe,’ occurring in lands so remote as Ceylon and Mexico, and the singular attestation by an English lady of the actual existence of the disturbance, makes this youaltepuztli one of the quaintest things in the province of the folklorist.  But, whatever the cause of the noise, or of the beliefs connected with the noise, may be, no one would explain them as the result of community of race between Cingalese and Aztecs.  Nor would this explanation be offered to account for the Aztec and English belief that the creaking of furniture is an omen of death in a house.  Obviously, these opinions are the expression of a common state of superstitious fancy, not the signs of an original community of origin.

Let us take another piece of folklore.  All North-country English folk know the Kernababy.  The custom of the ‘Kernababy’ is commonly observed in England, or, at all events, in Scotland, where the writer has seen many a kernababy.  The last gleanings of the last field are bound up in a rude imitation of the human shape, and dressed in some tag-rags of finery.  The usage has fallen into the conservative hands of children, but of old ‘the Maiden’ was a regular image of the harvest goddess, which, with a sickle and sheaves in her arms, attended by a crowd of reapers, and accompanied with music, followed the last carts home to the farm. {18}  It is odd enough that the ‘Maiden’ should exactly translate Κορη, the old Sicilian name of the daughter of Demeter.  ‘The Maiden’ has dwindled, then, among us to the rudimentary kernababy; but ancient Peru had her own Maiden, her Harvest Goddess.  Here it is easy to trace the natural idea at the basis of the superstitious practice which links the shores of the Pacific with our own northern coast.  Just as a portion of the yule-log and of the Christmas bread were kept all the year through, a kind of nest-egg of plenteous food and fire, so the kernababy, English or Peruvian, is an earnest that corn will not fail all through the year, till next harvest comes.  For this reason the kernababy used to be treasured from autumn’s end to autumn’s end, though now it commonly disappears very soon after the harvest home.  It is thus that Acosta describes, in Grimston’s old translation (1604), the Peruvian kernababy and the Peruvian harvest home:—

This feast is made comming from the chacra or farme unto the house, saying certaine songs, and praying that the Mays (maize) may long continue, the which they call Mama cora.

What a chance this word offers to etymologists of the old school: how promptly they would recognise, in mama mother—μητηρ, and in cora—κορη, the Mother and the Maiden, the feast of Demeter and Persephone!  However, the days of that old school of antiquarianism are numbered.  To return to the Peruvian harvest home:—

They take a certaine portion of the most fruitefull of the Mays that growes in their farmes, the which they put in a certaine granary which they do calle Pirua, with certaine ceremonies, watching three nightes; they put this Mays in the richest garments they have, and, being thus wrapped and dressed, they worship this Pirua, and hold it in great veneration, saying it is the Mother of the Mays of their inheritances, and that by this means the Mays augments and is preserved.  In this moneth they make a particular sacrifice, and the witches demand of this Pirua, ‘if it hath strength sufficient to continue until the next yeare,’ and if it answers ‘no,’ then they carry this Mays to the farme to burne, whence they brought it, according to every man’s power, then they make another Pirua, with the same ceremonies, saying that they renue it, to the ende that the seede of the Mays may not perish.

The idea that the maize can speak need not surprise us; the Mexican held much the same belief, according to Sahagun:—

It was thought that if some grains of maize fell on the ground, he who saw them lying there was bound to lift them, wherein, if he failed, he harmed the maize, which plained itself of him to God, saying, ‘Lord, punish this man, who saw me fallen and raised me not again; punish him with famine, that he may learn not to hold me in dishonour.’

Well, in all this affair of the Scotch kernababy, and the Peruvian Mama cora, we need no explanation beyond the common simple ideas of human nature.  We are not obliged to hold, either that the Peruvians and Scotch are akin by blood, nor that, at some forgotten time, they met each other, and borrowed each other’s superstitions.  Again, when we find Odysseus sacrificing a black sheep to the dead, {20} and when we read that the Ovahereroes in South Africa also appease with a black sheep the spirits of the departed, we do not feel it necessary to hint that the Ovahereroes are of Greek descent, or have borrowed their ritual from the Greeks.  The connection between the colour black, and mourning for the dead, is natural and almost universal.

Examples like these might be adduced in any number.  We might show how, in magic, negroes of Barbadoes make clay effigies of their enemies, and pierce them, just as Greeks did in Plato’s time, or the men of Accad in remotest antiquity.  We might remark the Australian black putting sharp bits of quartz in the tracks of an enemy who has gone by, that the enemy may be lamed; and we might point to Boris Godunof forbidding the same practice among the Russians.  We might watch Scotch, and Australians, and Jews, and French, and Aztecs spreading dust round the body of a dead man, that the footprints of his ghost, or of other ghosts, may be detected next morning.  We might point to a similar device in a modern novel, where the presence of a ghost is suspected, as proof of the similar workings of the Australian mind and of the mind of Mrs. Riddell.  We shall later turn to ancient Greece, and show how the serpent-dances, the habit of smearing the body with clay, and other odd rites of the mysteries, were common to Hellenic religion, and to the religion of African, Australian, and American tribes.

Now, with regard to all these strange usages, what is the method of folklore?  The method is, when an apparently irrational and anomalous custom is found in any country, to look for a country where a similar practice is found, and where the practice is no longer irrational and anomalous, but in harmony with the manners and ideas of the people among whom it prevails.  That Greeks should dance about in their mysteries with harmless serpents in their hands looks quite unintelligible.  When a wild tribe of Red Indians does the same thing, as a trial of courage, with real rattlesnakes, we understand the Red Man’s motives, and may conjecture that similar motives once existed among the ancestors of the Greeks.  Our method, then, is to compare the seemingly meaningless customs or manners of civilised races with the similar customs and manners which exist among the uncivilised and still retain their meaning.  It is not necessary for comparison of this sort that the uncivilised and the civilised race should be of the same stock, nor need we prove that they were ever in contact with each other.  Similar conditions of mind produce similar practices, apart from identity of race, or borrowing of ideas and manners.

Let us return to the example of the flint arrowheads.  Everywhere neolithic arrow-heads are pretty much alike.  The cause of the resemblance is no more than this, that men, with the same needs, the same materials, and the same rude instruments, everywhere produced the same kind of arrow-head.  No hypothesis of interchange of ideas nor of community of race is needed to explain the resemblance of form in the missiles.  Very early pottery in any region is, for the same causes, like very early pottery in any other region.  The same sort of similarity was explained by the same resemblances in human nature, when we touched on the identity of magical practices and of superstitious beliefs.  This method is fairly well established and orthodox when we deal with usages and superstitious beliefs; but may we apply the same method when we deal with myths?

Here a difficulty occurs.  Mythologists, as a rule, are averse to the method of folklore.  They think it scientific to compare only the myths of races which speak languages of the same family, and of races which have, in historic times, been actually in proved contact with each other.  Thus, most mythologists hold it correct to compare Greek, Slavonic, Celtic, and Indian stories, because Greeks, Slavs, Celts, and Hindoos all speak languages of the same family.  Again, they hold it correct to compare Chaldæan and Greek myths, because the Greeks and the Chaldæans were brought into contact through the Phœnicians, and by other intermediaries, such as the Hittites.  But the same mythologists will vow that it is unscientific to compare a Maori or a Hottentot or an Eskimo myth with an Aryan story, because Maoris and Eskimo and Hottentots do not speak languages akin to that of Greece, nor can we show that the ancestors of Greeks, Maoris, Hottentots, and Eskimo were ever in contact with each other in historical times.

Now the peculiarity of the method of folklore is that it will venture to compare (with due caution and due examination of evidence) the myths of the most widely severed races.  Holding that myth is a product of the early human fancy, working on the most rudimentary knowledge of the outer world, the student of folklore thinks that differences of race do not much affect the early mythopœic faculty.  He will not be surprised if Greeks and Australian blacks are in the same tale.

In each case, he holds, all the circumstances of the case must be examined and considered.  For instance, when the Australians tell a myth about the Pleiades very like the Greek myth of the Pleiades, we must ask a number of questions.  Is the Australian version authentic?  Can the people who told it have heard it from a European?  If these questions are answered so as to make it apparent that the Australian Pleiad myth is of genuine native origin, we need not fly to the conclusion that the Australians are a lost and forlorn branch of the Aryan race.  Two other hypotheses present themselves.  First, the human species is of unknown antiquity.  In the moderate allowance of 250,000 years, there is time for stories to have wandered all round the world, as the Aggry beads of Ashanti have probably crossed the continent from Egypt, as the Asiatic jade (if Asiatic it be) has arrived in Swiss lake-dwellings, as an African trade-cowry is said to have been found in a Cornish barrow, as an Indian Ocean shell has been discovered in a prehistoric bone-cave in Poland.  This slow filtration of tales is not absolutely out of the question.  Two causes would especially help to transmit myths.  The first is slavery and slave-stealing, the second is the habit of capturing brides from alien stocks, and the law which forbids marriage with a woman of a man’s own family.  Slaves and captured brides would bring their native legends among alien peoples.

But there is another possible way of explaining the resemblance (granting that it is proved) of the Greek and Australian Pleiad myth.  The object of both myths is to account for the grouping and other phenomena of the constellations.  May not similar explanatory stories have occurred to the ancestors of the Australians, and to the ancestors of the Greeks, however remote their home, while they were still in the savage condition?  The best way to investigate this point is to collect all known savage and civilised stellar myths, and see what points they have in common.  If they all agree in character, though the Greek tales are full of grace, while those of the Australians or Brazilians are rude enough, we may plausibly account for the similarity of myths, as we accounted for the similarity of flint arrow-heads.  The myths, like the arrow-heads, resemble each other because they were originally framed to meet the same needs out of the same material.  In the case of the arrow-heads, the need was for something hard, heavy, and sharp—the material was flint.  In the case of the myths, the need was to explain certain phenomena—the material (so to speak) was an early state of the human mind, to which all objects seemed equally endowed with human personality, and to which no metamorphosis appeared impossible.

In the following essays, then, the myths and customs of various peoples will be compared, even when these peoples talk languages of alien families, and have never (as far as history shows us) been in actual contact.  Our method throughout will be to place the usage, or myth, which is unintelligible when found among a civilised race, beside the similar myth which is intelligible enough when it is found among savages.  A mean term will be found in the folklore preserved by the non-progressive classes in a progressive people.  This folklore represents, in the midst of a civilised race, the savage ideas out of which civilisation has been evolved.  The conclusion will usually be that the fact which puzzles us by its presence in civilisation is a relic surviving from the time when the ancestors of a civilised race were in the state of savagery.  By this method it is not necessary that ‘some sort of genealogy should be established’ between the Australian and the Greek narrators of a similar myth, nor between the Greek and Australian possessors of a similar usage.  The hypothesis will be that the myth, or usage, is common to both races, not because of original community of stock, not because of contact and borrowing, but because the ancestors of the Greeks passed through the savage intellectual condition in which we find the Australians.

The questions may be asked, Has race nothing, then, to do with myth?  Do peoples never consciously borrow myths from each other?  The answer is, that race has a great deal to do with the development of myth, if it be race which confers on a people its national genius, and its capacity of becoming civilised.  If race does this, then race affects, in the most powerful manner, the ultimate development of myth.  No one is likely to confound a Homeric myth with a myth from the Edda, nor either with a myth from a Brahmana, though in all three cases the substance, the original set of ideas, may be much the same.  In all three you have anthropomorphic gods, capable of assuming animal shapes, tricky, capricious, limited in many undivine ways, yet endowed with magical powers.  So far the mythical gods of Homer, of the Edda, of any of the Brahmanas, are on a level with each other, and not much above the gods of savage mythology.  This stuff of myth is quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus, and is the original gift of the savage intellect.  But the final treatment, the ultimate literary form of the myth, varies in each race.  Homeric gods, like Red Indian, Thlinkeet, or Australian gods, can assume the shapes of birds.  But when we read, in Homer, of the arming of Athene, the hunting of Artemis, the vision of golden Aphrodite, the apparition of Hermes, like a young man when the flower of youth is loveliest, then we recognise the effect of race upon myth, the effect of the Greek genius at work on rude material.  Between the Olympians and a Thlinkeet god there is all the difference that exists between the Demeter of Cnidos and an image from Easter Island.  Again, the Scandinavian gods, when their tricks are laid aside, when Odin is neither assuming the shape of worm nor of raven, have a martial dignity, a noble enduring spirit of their own.  Race comes out in that, as it does in the endless sacrifices, soma drinking, magical austerities, and puerile follies of Vedic and Brahmanic gods, the deities of a people fallen early into its sacerdotage and priestly second childhood.  Thus race declares itself in the ultimate literary form and character of mythology, while the common savage basis and stuff of myths may be clearly discerned in the horned, and cannibal, and shape-shifting, and adulterous gods of Greece, of India, of the North.  They all show their common savage origin, when the poet neglects Freya’s command and tells of what the gods did ‘in the morning of Time.’

As to borrowing, we have already shown that in prehistoric times there must have been much transmission of myth.  The migrations of peoples, the traffic in slaves, the law of exogamy, which always keeps bringing alien women into the families—all these things favoured the migration of myth.  But the process lies behind history: we can only guess at it, we can seldom trace a popular legend on its travels.  In the case of the cultivated ancient peoples, we know that they themselves believed they had borrowed their religions from each other.  When the Greeks first found the Egyptians practising mysteries like their own, they leaped to the conclusion that their own rites had been imported from Egypt.  We, who know that both Greek and Egyptian rites had many points in common with those of Mandans, Zunis, Bushmen, Australians—people quite unconnected with Egypt—feel less confident about the hypothesis of borrowing.  We may, indeed, regard Adonis, and Zeus Bagæus, and Melicertes, as importations from Phœnicia.  In later times, too, the Greeks, and still more the Romans, extended a free hospitality to alien gods and legends, to Serapis, Isis, the wilder Dionysiac revels, and so forth.  But this habit of borrowing was regarded with disfavour by pious conservatives, and was probably, in the width of its hospitality at least, an innovation.  As Tiele remarks, we cannot derive Dionysus from the Assyrian Daian nisi, ‘judge of men,’ a name of the solar god Samas, without ascertaining that the wine-god exercised judicial functions, and was a god of the sun.  These derivations, ‘shocking to common sense,’ are to be distrusted as part of the intoxication of new learning.  Some Assyrian scholars actually derive Hades from Bit Edi or Bit Hadi—‘though, unluckily,’ says Tiele, ‘there is no such word in the Assyrian text.’  On the whole topic Tiele’s essay {28} deserves to be consulted.  Granting, then, that elements in the worship of Dionysus, Aphrodite, and other gods, may have been imported with the strange Ægypto-Assyrian vases and jewels of the Sidonians, we still find the same basis of rude savage ideas.  We may push back a god from Greece to Phœnicia, from Phœnicia to Accadia, but, at the end of the end, we reach a legend full of myths like those which Bushmen tell by the camp-fire, Eskimo in their dark huts, and Australians in the shade of the gunyeh—myths cruel, puerile, obscene, like the fancies of the savage myth-makers from which they sprang.
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  • 耿羽 宝葫芦 +3 2010-5-7 10:15
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